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Heteronormativity in Employment Discrimination Law
Naomi Schoenbaum*
This symposium Essay responds to the EEOC's new decision to interpret
federal employment discriminationlaw's ban on discrimination on the basis
ofsex to include a ban on discriminationon the basis ofsexual orientation. It
argues that although the EEOC's decision does provide cause to celebrate,
ongoing heteronormativity in federal employment discrimination law will
continue to stand as a barrier to equal employment opportunity for gay
workers. First, Title VII provides an exception to the sex discriminationban
in the context of intimate spaces, allowing, for example, only women to be
hired to serve as labor and delivery nurses. This exception proceeds on the
assumption that same-sex spaces are no-sex spaces, furthering the
presumption that all employees are heterosexual. Second, Title VII provides
an exception to the ban on sex discriminationin the context of role-modeling
for children, allowing, for example, only women to be hired as counselors to
serve as role models for female clients. This exception assumes that sex
dictates the ability to fulfill particularparenting roles, furthering the notion
that heterosexual couples have a parentingadvantage over same-sex couples.
Finally, Title VII's ban on sexual harassmentgenerally treats male-on-female
harassment as sex discrimination by assuming that harassers are
heterosexual, reinforcing heteronormative assumptions with every such case.
So while the EEOC's decision will provide some protectionfor gay workers, a
more searching inquiry of the law to root out bias on the basis of sexual
orientationwill be necessaryfor employment discriminationlaw to achieve its
promise of equal employment opportunityfor these workers.

* I very much appreciate the feedback I received from Naomi Cahn, Jessica Clarke, Doug NeJaime,
participants in Washburn Law Journal's symposium on the Future of Labor and Employment Law: Power,
Policies, and Politics, and participants in the University of Chicago Law School's Workshop on the
Regulation of Family, Sex, and Gender, especially Mary Anne Case, Alex Boni-Saenz, and Kathy Baker,
who graciously served as my commentator.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Even before Obergefell v. Hodges1 found a right to same-sex marriage in
the U.S. Constitution, it was remarked with surprise that we were more likely
to get gay rights in the family before we got them in the market. And this
prediction has come true. We now have a federal right to gay marriage, but
we have no nationwide right to nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in employment. 2
The EEOC has stepped in to try to change this. It has announced an
interpretation of federal employment discrimination law's ban on sex
discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 3
This position was not new. Scholars had long advocated for it, 4 and some
courts had reached this outcome some of the time, especially in circumstances
when plaintiffs, although gay, had evidence that they were discriminated
against (especially harassed) because of their failure to conform to sex
stereotypes. 5 However, many courts rejected claims by gay plaintiffs because
they were trying to shoehorn protection under the sex discrimination ban that
Congress clearly did not intend. 6 The EEOC's move here has thus been
rightly applauded. A blanket ban on sexual orientation discrimination would
mark significant progress for gay workers.
While recognizing the progress that a ban on transgender or sexual
orientation discrimination under Title VII would make, 7 this brief symposium
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. After the EEOC changed its position on the issue, the circuits split as to whether Title VII bans
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Compare, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind.,
853 F.3d 339, 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en bane) (yes), with Evans v. Ga. Reg'1 Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256-57
(1Ith Cir. 2017) (no). Almost half the states grant such protection, as well as many cities. See Past LGBT
Nondiscrimination and Anti-LGBT Bills Across the Country, ACLU, https://www.aclu.orglother/past-lgbt-

nondiscrimination-and-anti-lgbt-bills-across-countryredirect-node/40573 [http://perma.cc/88RL-74E4].
3. The EEOC interprets the sex discrimination ban to include a ban of sexual orientation
discrimination on two grounds: (1) that a person (e.g., woman) who is discriminated against because of an
attraction to persons of the same sex (women) is discriminated against because of her sex because if she were
a different sex (i.e., a man) and thus attracted to a person of the opposite sex, she would be treated differently,
and (2) that discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation amounts to sex stereotyping held to violate Title
VII under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239, 241-42 (1989), because a person who is attracted
to a person of the same sex fails to conform to sex stereotypes (of being attracted to the opposite sex). See,
e.g., Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 16, 2015); Lusardi v. McHugh,
EEOC Decision 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 (Apr. 1, 2015); Macy v. Holder, EEOC Decision
0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 2012).
4. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex

Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(Pregerson, J., concurring) (explaining that sexual harassment of a gay man was sex discrimination because
the man was harassed for failing to meet masculine stereotypes).
6. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
7. Indeed, recognizing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender identity as sex
discrimination rather than on a protected-trait theory (i.e., an express statutory ban on discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation or transgender identity) has the promise to bring more progress for equal
employment opportunity. First, a sex-stereotyping rather than a protected-trait approach has the promise to
reaffirm and expand a broad reading of Title VII's ban on sex stereotyping, which could aid gendernonconforming plaintiffs, regardless of their sexual orientation, and which could spill over into other areas of
law that ban sex discrimination, such as education, without requiring amendments to those laws. Second, a
sex-stereotyping rather than a protected-trait approach would likely avoid the concern that only those
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Essay takes a more skeptical view of the law's progress for gay workers, by
looking at the whole of Title VII. A more comprehensive survey of Title
VII's attitude and approach towards sexuality reveals that even if courts were
to adopt the EEOC's interpretation-indeed, even if Congress were to pass
protection against sexual orientation discrimination in employment at the
federal level-aspects of Title VII would continue to reinforce the secondclass status of gay workers. Although the EEOC's decision has the potential
to make progress in this realm,8 the status of gay workers will be held back by
other features of Title VII. To return to Obergefell, not only have we
achieved gay rights in the family before the market, but historical inequality
from the family is continuing to spill over into the market, despite current
equality in the family, and despite the move towards equality in the market.
This Essay explores the ways in which, notwithstanding recent
developments in interpreting Title VII to protect the rights of gay workers,
Title VII remains deeply inflected with heteronormative assumptions that are
in tension with the full equality of gay people, both at work and beyond. This
essay proceeds in three Parts. The first Part addresses the sex-based bona fide
occupation qualification (BFOQ) as a doctrinal feature of Title VII that rests
upon and reinforces heteronormative assumptions in two ways: by assuming
that same-sex spaces are no-sex spaces, and by crediting "role-model"
theories of childcare that rely on sex-matching between worker and child that
are in tension with the full legitimacy of same-sex marriage. The second Part
addresses sexual harassment as another feature of Title VII that rests upon and
reinforces heteronormative assumptions, in two ways: by assuming that maleon-female sexual harassment is based in sexual desire, and by scrutinizing
same-sex sexual harassment through the lens of heteronormative expectations
of sexuality and desire. The third Part briefly considers the harms of these
heteronormative assumptions as well as what advocates for gay workers could

plaintiffs whose gender nonconformity is so serious and verifiable that it can be fit within the boxes of sexual
orientation or gender identity disorder will have claims, leaving out the effeminate man who just likes to wear
skirts, or the masculine woman who does not want to wear make-up. See Mary Anne Case, Legal
Protectionsfor the "PersonalBest" of Each Employee: Title VII's Prohibitionon Sex Discrimination, the
Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1336 (2009)
("[A] turn toward [protection on the basis of sexual orientation and transgender identity] and away from Title
VII could privilege those gender benders who can and do claim an identity as transgender or gay, but could
increasingly leave out those who cannot or do not choose to claim such an identity, including those whose
transgression of conventional gender norms is less extreme, consistent, or unidirectional. Such a result would
be a step backward for the freedom of gender expression and from sex stereotyping for all individuals,
betraying the promise of Title VII and making it harder for many employees to give their actual personal
best."). Finally, a sex-stereotyping rather than a protected-trait approach would avoid the concern that
plaintiffs are denied protection based on a narrow reading of the protected class. See Naomi Schoenbaum,
The Casefor Symmetry in AntidiscriminationLaw, 2017 Wis. L. REv. (forthcoming 2017); Jessica A. Clarke,
Protected Class Gatekeeping, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
8. Given the relatively little deference courts tend to afford the EEOC, the EEOC's change in position
on the issue itself will not likely be dispositive, but rather can serve as one among many bases on which to
ask courts to reconsider their position on the issue. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to

Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1118 (2008) (finding low levels of deference to EEOC).
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do to remedy these barriers to equality.
II. HETERONORMATIVITY AND THE BFOQ

Title VII's exception to intentional sex discrimination-a BFOQ for
sex-means that there are certain circumstances in which federal employment
discrimination law validates the salience of sex to employment. 9 Given the
entanglement between sexual orientation discrimination and sex stereotypes,
the existence of an exception recognizing the salience of sex in employment,
which only furthers normative sex stereotypes, 10 might be seen as at odds
with a law recognizing the full equality of gay workers. This is because
same-sex sexual orientation challenges one of the most fundamental sex
stereotypes: that men are attracted to women, and that women are attracted to
men.
But the tension between Title VII and the equal status of gay workers
goes beyond this general concern surrounding the salience of sex under the
BFOQ. Rather, particular applications of the BFOQ rely on heteronormative
assumptions about the salience of sex that are in direct conflict with a law that
fully recognizes gay workers as equal members of the workforce. These
assumptions relate to the role of sex in sexuality and the respective roles of
men and women in the family in ways that directly contradict equality on the
basis of sexual orientation at work and in the family. These are discussed in
turn.
A. Same-Sex Spaces as No-Sex Spaces
Title VII provides an exception to its ban on sex discrimination in the
context of intimate spaces, allowing, for example, only women to be hired as
labor and delivery nurses.II This exception often plays out in the context of
sex-segregated spaces, such as prisons and bathrooms: the BFOQ allows
employers to match workers by sex so that workers, such as correctional
officers or janitors, do not muddy the otherwise neat division of the sexes in
these spaces.1 2 The segregation of these spaces, and by extension, the
application of the sex-based BFOQ in them, relies on a deeply
heteronormative assumption: that same-sex spaces are no-sex spaces. 13
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) ("[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of. . . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain

instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification . . . .").
10. A stereotype is "any imperfect proxy," or "any overbroad generalization." Mary Anne Case, "The

Very Stereotype the Law Condemns ": ConstitutionalSex DiscriminationLaw as a Questfor Perfect Proxies,

85 CORNELL L. REv. 1447, 1449 (2000).
11. See id.; Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law ofIntimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REv. 1167, 1190 (2015).
12. See, e.g., Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (attendants
responsible for cleaning bathrooms); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982)
(janitor responsible for cleaning bathrooms).
13. See Schoenbaum, supra note 11, at 1190.
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Sex segregation is a regulatory tool used to remove sexuality from
segregated spaces. This tool achieves its goal only when we assume that all
persons in these spaces are heterosexual. As sociologists Kristen Schilt and
Laurel Westbrook explain,
[t]his assumption [of heterosexuality] makes gender-segregated spaces seem
safe because they are then "sexuality-free zones." . . . Gender-segregated
spaces .. . can be conceived of as both homophobic and heterophobic, as the
fear is about unwanted sexual acts in supposedly sex-neutral spaces. Unlike
normative sexual interactions, where gender difference is required to make the
interaction acceptable, in gender-segregated spaces, gender difference is a
source of discomfort and potential sexual threat and danger. 14

Take bathrooms, for example.1 5 There are multiple understandings
behind the sex segregation of bathrooms. 16 Importantly for our purposes, one
of the reasons behind sex-segregated bathrooms is the heteronormative
assumption that same-sex spaces will not entail sexuality or acts of sex. As
Professor Terry Kogan has recognized, the sex segregation of public
restrooms is premised in a view of women as "inherently vulnerable and in
7
need of protection when in public" and men as "inherently predatory."l This
is sexist, in that it assumes that women are always prey and never predators,
and that men are always predators and never prey. 18 This is also heterosexist,
in that it ignores that men may sexually prey on other men, or that women
may sexually prey on other women.
In the construction of this fiction, gay men and lesbians are obscured
from view. "Because there are only two gender categories, gay men and
lesbians must share gender-segregated [bathrooms] with heterosexual men
and women, respectively, an entrance that is tolerated as long as such entrants
demonstrate the appropriate visual cues for admittance and use the bathroom
for the 'right' purpose (waste elimination)." 1 9
So too with the sex segregation of prisons, which are one of-if not the
Prisons were
most-sex-segregated institutions in the modem world.
20
If male sexual
segregated by sex largely for the safety of female inmates.
14. Laurel Westbrook & Kristen Schilt, Doing Gender, Determining Gender: Transgender People,
Gender Panics, and the Maintenance of the Sex/Gender/Sexuality System, 28 GENDER & SOCIETY 32, 49

(2014).
15. Interestingly, the first same-sex bathroom law in the U.S. passed in 1887 in Massachusetts
regulated bathrooms in employment: "Wherever male and female persons are employed in the same factory
or workshop, a significant number of separate and distinct water-closets, earth-closets, or privies shall be
provided for the use of each sex and should be plainly designated." Terry S. Kogan, Sex Separation:The
Cure-All for Victorian Social Anxiety, in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 145,

145 n.1 (Harvey Molotch & Laura Nor6n, eds., 2010). Mixed use of such facilities is prohibited. See id.
16. Id. (arguing that sex-segregated bathrooms came about in part because of anxiety about women's

role in public); see also Jennifer L. Levi, Paving the Road: A Charles Hamilton Houston Approach to
Securing Trans Rights, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5, 16 (2000) ("Two common explanations for sex-

segregated bathrooms are privacy and safety.").
17. Kogan, supra note 15, at 164.
18. Id.
19. Westbrook & Schilt, supra note 14, at 49.
20. Note, The Sexual Segregation of Prisons, 82 YALE L. J. 1229 (1973); Jennifer Sumner & Valerie
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predators were removed from their female sexual prey, the problem of sex
(and especially procreative sex and sexual assault) would be removed from
prisons.
As with bathrooms, this relies on the same assumption of
heterosexuality: that men would prey only on female targets (and that no
women would sexually prey on their sistren). This fiction has persisted
despite widespread recognition of sexuality and sexual assault in sexsegregated prisons. 2 1
The assumption of the same-sex space as the no-sex space can be seen
perhaps most clearly in the concern raised by the entrance of transgendered
people into sex-segregated spaces, especially transgender women into
women's bathrooms. It is what one might call a "sex panic" due to the fear
that transgender women will sexually assault women, or that men will dress
up as transgender women to do so. 22 The entrance of biological "men" into
these spaces injects sexuality into a space where it did not exist before.
Transgender women's "presence transforms a nonsexual space into a
dangerously (hetero) sexual one. Within this heteronormative logic, all
bodies with male anatomies, regardless of gender identity, desire female
bodies, and many of them (enough to elicit concern from the public) are
willing to use force to get access to those bodies." 23
By applying the sex-based BFOQ to uphold sex segregation in spaces
like bathrooms and prisons, Title VII relies on and furthers the
heteronormative assumption of same-sex spaces as no-sex spaces. Sometimes
the cases even make this explicit. For example, in EEOC v. Mercy Health
Center,24 the employer successfully advanced a BFOQ defense to its allfemale hiring policy for labor and delivery nurses out of concerns of
"molestation." 25 In this way, the application of the sex-based BFOQ
Jenness, Gender Integration in Sex-Segregated US. Prisons: The Paradox of Transgender Correctional

Policy, in HANDBOOK OF LGBT COMMUNITIES, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 229 (Dana Peterson & Vanessa R.
Panfil, eds., 2013).
21. One might posit then that the core concern is not sexuality per se but procreative sex or the sexual
violation of women.
22. See Jeff Brady, When A TransgenderPerson Uses A PublicBathroom, Who Is At Risk?, NPR (May

15, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/05/15/477954537/when-a-transgender-person-uses-a-public-bathroomwho-is-at-risk [http://permacc/XA8P-JZ9Z]. Consider, for example, North Carolina officials' justification
for the state's sex-segregated bathroom law against a challenge of transgender discrimination by federal
government: "It's unacceptable for the Obama administration to try to intimidate North Carolina taxpayers
into accepting their radical reinterpretation of a law meant to protect women from discrimination into a law
that would actually deny women their right to basic safety and privacy."
Mark Berman et al., North Carolina, Justice Dept. File Dueling Lawsuits Over Transgender Rights, WASH.

POST (May 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/05/09/north-carolinajustice-dept-face-monday-deadline-for-bathroom-bill/?utm-term-.b56b5 1e5f85b
[http://perma.cc/9ZHG3W9K].
23. Westbrook & Schilt, supra note 14, at 48-49 ("The 'safe' (read: gender-segregated) space is
transformed into a dangerous, sexual situation by the entrance of an 'improper body.' . . . That these
imagined sexual assaults occur only in women-only spaces is worth further analysis, as women share space
with men daily without similar concerns.").
24. No. Civ-80-1374-W, 1982 WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982).
25. Id. at *3 (explaining that "Mercy also has maintained a 'chaperon' policy to provide protection
from claims of molestation for the physicians by providing a female 'chaperon,' " which "requires that a
female staff member be present during the examination of a female patient by a male physician" or a "male
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shoehorns even employment discrimination law into furthering heterosexist
assumptions, regardless of the protections it affords gay and lesbian workers.
Even those advocating for the rights of gay, lesbian, and transgender
workers under Title VII, including the EEOC, have failed to target this
heterosexist logic, and instead have reinforced it. The progressive response to
advancing the rights of transgender workers has not been to challenge the sex
segregation of bathrooms or the heterosexist assumptions on which they rest.
Rather, plaintiffs in these cases and the EEOC accept the sex-segregated
bathroom, and instead seek access to bathrooms for transgender workers on
Challenging
the basis of identified rather than biological sex. 26
the
sex binary
heteronormativity in the workplace would require challenging
27
entirely, including sex-segregated bathrooms.
There are surely reasons to sex segregate intimate spaces aside from
28
eliminating sexuality, including comfort, safety, and cleanliness concerns.
But many of these justifications are still, at bottom, concerns about sex. The
reason why women feel more comfortable and safer in sex-segregated
intimate spaces is in large part precisely because of the assumption that sex
will not be a part of those spaces. If we were to remove this heteronormative
assumption, there may still be some residual comfort from sex-segregating
such spaces. But we should question how much of this comfort derives from
the path dependence of preferences. We may feel more comfortable with sexsegregated intimate spaces simply because that is what we have always
known. The law played a role in constructing these preferences, and the law
can play a role in deconstructing them. 29
Evidence on sex preferences in intimate spaces suggests that preferences
here are susceptible to change and the force of law. For example, while
women currently prefer female gynecologists, this preference arose only
relatively recently. 30 Until just a few decades ago, when gynecology was a
student nurse[]"). I thank Naomi Cahn for this reference.
26. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841 (E.D. Mich.
2016) (in a case of a male-to-female transgender plaintiff who was terminated because she "intended to 'dress
as a woman,' " the EEOC did "not challenge the [employer]'s sex-specific dress code" but rather "takes the
position that [plaintiff] has a Title VII right to 'dress as a woman' (i.e., dress in a stereotypical feminine
manner) while working at the [employer], in order to express [her) gender identity"). Indeed, once a
transgender worker can gain access to the bathroom (or locker room or dress code) of her choice, the sex
binary actually helps the transgender worker in her transition. The ways in which the transgender rights legal
movement reinforces the sex binary and thus undermines sex equality is the subject of a separate project. See
Naomi Schoenbaum, (Trans)genderTrouble (unpublished manuscript).
27. This will be no small feat, given that sex segregated bathrooms are typically required under state
law and OSHA. See, e.g., Sanitation, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(c)(1)(i) (2016) (requiring sex-separated toilets).
28. See Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish the Laws of Urinary Segregation, in TOILET: PUBLc
RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING xx (Harvey Molotch & Laura Nor6n, eds., 2010); Naomi

Schoenbaum, Gender and the SharingEconomy, 43 FORD. URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
29. See Kogan, supra note 15, at 156-64 (reviewing the role of law in developing the norm of samesex bathrooms in public, especially at work).

30. See Tamar Lewin, Women's Health Is No Longer a Man s World, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2001, at

Al4. For further discussion of the construction of intimate preferences, see Schoenbaum, supra note 11, at
1187-98.
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male profession, women saw male gynecologists without complaint. This
shift in preference for female gynecologists, of course, was prompted in large
part by Title VII opening up the medical profession to women. There is
reason to believe then that preferences even in these most intimate of spaces
can be responsive to law.
B. Sex-Based Role-Modeling
Until the constitutional sex equality revolution, the Constitution
enshrined a law of sex-based roles in the family.3 1 Under this view, "[i]t was
man's lot, because of his nature, to be breadwinner, head of household,
representative of the family outside the home; and it was woman's lot,
because of her nature, not only to bear, but also to raise children, and keep the
home in order." 32 In the 1970s, the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on
sex discrimination dismantled these legally enforced role differentiation in
marriage.
Even while the Constitution policed laws enforcing sex roles in the
family, sex-based family roles remained a basis for rejecting same-sex
marriage. 33 The idea that gay parents were not adequate to raise children was
not only or always because they were gay parents, but at least sometimes
because they were two parents of the same sex, rather than a man and woman.
The argument ran that for children to develop properly, they needed the
influence of both the feminine traits of a mother and the masculine traits of a
father. 34 While this flavor of the argument emphasized the need for a child of
any sex to have one parent of each sex, sometimes the argument had a more
sex-specific flavor: that it was important developmentally for girls to have a
mother around, and for boys to have a father around.
The final rejection of the idea that a child needs both a male and a
female parental role model came with Obergefell v. Hodges, which in
recognizing a federal right to same-sex marriage rejected the notion that there
was anything inferior about parenting by same-sex couples, and thus anything

&

31. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Part of the Constitution, 6 LAW
INEQUALITY 17, 19 (1988).

32. Id.
33. Discrimination against gay men and lesbians has been rooted in the challenges they pose to
traditional sex roles more broadly. See Case, supra note 10, at 1488 ("[P]rohibitions on homosexuality rely
on stereotypes in the sense that they are based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of men and
women.' These notions have some subordinating taint, in that among their normative premises are that
women should not be free of men and that men should not behave sexually as women do-receptively in anal
intercourse or fellatio."); EEOC v. Scott Med Health Ctr., P.C., Civil Action No. 16-225, 2016 WL 6569233,
at *1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2016) (" 'I don't understand how you fucking fags have sex,' and 'Who's the butch
and who is the bitch?' ")
34. See Douglas NeJaime, Elizabeth Rosenblatt, & Deborah Widiss, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in
Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 461, 463 (2007) (documenting that

courts "have upheld different-sex marriage requirements on the grounds that men and women, simply by
virtue of their gender, provide distinct role models for children" and "that men and women play 'opposite' or
'complementary' roles within marriage").
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necessary (or even materially beneficial) about having one parent of each
sex. 35 If two men or two women can be just as good parents as a man and a
woman, sex has been fully decoupled from parenting as a matter of
constitutional law.
Even though constitutional law has rejected the idea that a parent of a
particular sex, or one parent of each sex, is important for the proper
development of children, employment discrimination law relies on precisely
this logic in recognizing exceptions to the ban on sex discrimination under the
BFOQ. 36 Courts have recognized that employers are entitled to a sex-based
BFOQ for jobs that require workers to serve as "role models" to children on
the theory that only men can serve as appropriate role models to boys and
37
Title VII provides
only women can serve as appropriate role model to girls.
an exception to the ban on sex discrimination in the context of role-modeling
for children, allowing, for example, only women to be hired as counselors to
serve as role models for female clients. 38 This exception assumes that sex
dictates the ability to fulfill particular caregiving roles, furthering the notion
that heterosexual couples have a parenting advantage over same-sex couples.
To be sure, the cases identified here address caregiver sex roles in the
therapeutic rather than the standard parenting context. Notably, though, the
Third Circuit specifically references "parental" role-modeling in approving
39
Even in the
the application of the sex-based BFOQ to these caregiving jobs.
therapeutic context, recognizing sex as relevant to providing care or guidance
to children is highly evocative of arguments that have been relied on to reject
equal rights to marriage for same-sex couples and calls into question the

ability of same-sex couples to provide the same quality of family life that
heterosexual couples can provide.

35. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600-01 (2015).
36. While constitutional law requires that the state not mandate sex roles in private families, families
still retain the right to choose how to arrange themselves, including along traditional gender lines. The law
recognizes the interests at stake in employment to be quite different, and does not afford employers the same
liberty.
37. See Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that sex was
a BFOQ for staff members of a psychiatric hospital serving children on the basis that "Southwood has
presented expert testimony that staffing both males and females on all shifts is necessary to provide
therapeutic care. 'Role modeling,' including parental role modeling, is an important element of the staffs
job, and a male is better able to serve as a male role model than a female and vice versa."); Leggett v.
Milwaukee Cty., No. 04-C-422, 2006 WL 3289371, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2006) (holding that sex was a
BFOQ for juvenile correction officer because to allow for "the implementation of same-gender role modeling
and mentoring," as "[s]tudies have demonstrated that same-gender role modeling provides greater
rehabilitative success"); EEOC Decision No. 76-130, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) P 6692 (1976) (finding that
sex was a BFOQ for counseling the mentally handicapped, in part to provide appropriate sex-role models); cf
Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 704 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (acknowledging that "the ability to . . . provide
sex-role models .. .might, in some situations, justify a preference for one sex," but rejecting the BFOQ in
that case based on the facts concerning the particular job in question).
38. Healey, 78 F.3d at 133.
39. Id.
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HETERONORMATIVITY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Title VII's ban on sexual harassment generally treats male-on-female
harassment as sex discrimination by assuming that harassers are heterosexual,
reinforcing heteronormativity with each decision. This assumption arose in
response to one of the core challenges in recognizing sexual harassment as a
wrong that comes within the ambit of employment discrimination law. For it
to be so, sexual harassment had to be discrimination "because of sex"-that
is, because the plaintiff was female rather than male. 40 Courts initially
rejected this contention on the ground that the practice of supervisors
subjecting employees to unwanted sexual advances did not systematically
distinguish between workers on the basis of sex. 4 1
As Professor Reva Siegel recounts, the answer to this doctrinal puzzle
came in 1977 in Barnes v. Costle42 by "locat[ing] the act of class-categorical
discrimination in the presumed [straight] sexual orientation of the harasser." 43
The Barnes court understood the male supervisor to have allegedly
conditioned the female employee's job "upon submission to sexual relations
an extraction which the supervisor would not have soughtfrom any male," as
"there is no suggestion that appellant's allegedly amorous supervisor is other
than heterosexual." 44 So while Barnes paid lip service to applying this
understanding of harassment "because of sex" to cases where the supervisor is
"homosexual," heterosexuality is the default.45
When there is "no
suggestion" otherwise, courts will simply assume heterosexuality. 46
This assumption has persisted, even in the Supreme Court. In cases of
male-on-female harassment in the presence of any sexual content, courts
typically do not require that plaintiffs allege, much less prove, the sexual
orientation of the harasser. Instead, courts simply assume the harasser is
heterosexual, and that the conduct is based in sexual desire. As the Supreme
Court explained in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: 47 "Courts
and juries have found the inference of discrimination [because of sex] easy to
draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the
40. Unlawful Employment Practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
41. See Reva Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL

HARASSMENT LAW 11 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva Siegel, eds. 2003). For example: "In this instance
the supervisor was male and the employee was female. But no immutable principle of psychology compels
this assignment of parties. The gender lines might as easily have been reversed or even not crossed at all.
While sexual desire animated the parties, or at least one of them, the gender of each is incidental to the claim
of abuse." Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976).
42. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
43. Id. at 989-90; Siegel, supra note 41, at 12.
44. Tomkins, 561 F.2d at 989-90 n.49.
45. Although not for the "bisexual supervisor," for whom "the insistence upon sexual favors would not
constitute gender discrimination because it would apply to male and female employees alike." Id. at 997
n.55. Although the oral argument in Oncale was preoccupied with this question, according to a 2013 study of
the post-Oncale cases, this defense has succeeded only once. See Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63
DUKE L.J. 525, 539-40 n.57 (2013).
46. Tomkins, 561 F.2d at 989-90 n.49.
47. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual
activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made
to someone of the same sex. The same chain of inference would be available
to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence
that the harasser was homosexual." 48
Again, the default is heterosexuality. It is "reasonable to assume" that
male-female proposals of sexual activity "would not have been made to
someone of the same sex." 4 9 But "[t]he same chain of inference" is only
available for male-male or female-female proposals of sexual activity when
there is "credible evidence that the harasser [i]s homosexual." 50 While this
makes it easier for female plaintiffs to proceed on their claims of sexual
harassment, it relies on and reinforces heteronormative assumptions with
every such case.
In addition to the general presumption of heterosexuality perpetuated by
these cases of male-on-female harassment, Professor Jessica Clarke's study of
same-sex harassment cases after Oncale reveals how courts assessing
evidence of a harasser's "homosexual" 5 1 identity not only assume but
"Unless a purported harasser identifies as
privilege heterosexuality. 52
nonheterosexual, courts are loath to characterize same-sex interactions as
motivated by desire." 53 As Professor Clarke suggests, the reluctance of
courts to attribute same-sex desire to harassers suggests "a negative view of
gay identity: the idea that a court should not deviate from the presumption of
heterosexuality without overwhelming evidence because homosexuality is
thought to be inferior, morally suspect, or stigmatized." 54 And courts'
unwillingness to find harassment in cases of same-sex harassment unless the
harasser is openly gay or lesbian amounts to a punishment-and thus a
disincentive-for coming out.5 5
IV. WRONGS AND REMEDIES

So what exactly is the harm of Title VII relying on and reinforcing
heteronormative assumptions? Some of the troubling consequences are those
referenced above: encouraging the "sex panic" associated with transgender
persons accessing locker rooms and bathrooms, furthering the notion that
48. Id. at 80.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. See Clarke, supra note 45, 528.
53. Id. at 530.
54. Id. at 549.
55. Id. at 550. Professor Clarke notes courts' tendency to protect heterosexuality in two ways: courts
are especially reluctant to find an alleged same-sex harasser to be motivated by sexual desire when the
harasser is in a heterosexual marriage, and courts are especially prone to finding an alleged same-sex harasser
to be motivated by sexual desire when they suggest that they can "turn" heterosexual persons gay or lesbian.
See id. at 530, 581-82.
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lesbian and gay parents are inferior, or more generally stigmatizing gay
workers. But I would posit that perhaps the greatest-and most insidiousharm is incurring a cost for being gay or lesbian in the workplace.
Even though some of the heteronormative assumptions discussed above
are not reflective of the value of gay or lesbian workers as workers, the more
that employment discrimination law perpetuates the default of
heterosexuality, the harder this makes it for workers who do not match this
expectation. 56 Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have written about
the costs of having to "work" your identity at work. 57 As they explain,
because "members of [disadvantaged] groups are often likely to perceive
themselves as subject to negative stereotypes, they are also likely to feel the
need to do significant amounts of 'extra' identity work to counter those
stereotypes." 5 8 Take, for example, the discomfort that a lesbian worker may
face by taking her wife to a work holiday party, or even referring to her wife
at work. The more that society assumes that workers are heterosexual, the
more that gay workers have to "work" their identities in ways that impose
costs that heterosexual workers need not bear.
So what exactly can be done to alleviate the heteronormativity of Title
VII? This Essay does not take a position about the direction the law should
take, but instead aims to highlight possible responses and their costs. As for
the BFOQ, a number of scholars have called for an end to the sex-based
BFOQ, particularly as it applies to uphold privacy norms. 5 9 While
heteronormativity alone probably does not justify eliminating the exception, it
adds yet another argument to sex stereotyping and other concerns that
underlie the case against the BFOQ in these contexts.
As for sexual harassment law, courts could treat opposite-sex and samesex harassment equally, either by raising the bar for proving that an oppositesex harasser is heterosexual, or by lowering the bar for proving that a samesex harasser is gay. The first approach raises concerns about making it more
difficult for female plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment by men-the vast
majority of sexual harassment claimants-to stake a claim. The second
approach raises concerns of evidentiary validity, as the assumption of
heterosexuality is far more likely to be correct as a matter of statistical
probability than the assumption of homosexuality. Yet another approach
would be to move away from a "because of sex" requirement entirely and

56. Although, importantly, queer theorists who have critiqued the mainstreaming of gay identity would
find value in the "queerness" of gay identity. See generally Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex
MarriagePolitics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006).

57. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2000).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 11, at 1237; Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and
Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical Frameworkfor Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 327 (1985); Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacyand the Limits of AntidiscriminationLaw, 112 YALE

L. J. 1257, 1261-62 (2003).
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follow in the footsteps of a number of foreign jurisdictions that protect against
workplace harassment-often referred to as bullying-more generally.60
Again, heteronormativity alone might not justify such a shift in the law, but it
can add another argument to the case for it.
V. CONCLUSION

Title VII has been celebrated for bringing about major shifts in norms in
the workplace and beyond. But evaluating employment discrimination
protection for gay workers reveals the limits of a rights-claiming system to
bring about such shifts. Granting a right of nondiscrimination to gay workers
can be expected to shift norms. But rights-granting falls short of interrogating
the internal logic of features of Title VII's protection against sex
discrimination that are laced with heteronormativity. Without additional
efforts, then, even a nationwide right of nondiscrimination will fail to achieve
its promise of full equality for gay workers.

60. See David Yamada, The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for Status-Blind
Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000). For a critical take on such an approach, see
Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections,86 IND. L.J. 1219

(2011).

